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by Barbara Kehler, M.A. 
Subject or Individual?  
Individual Subject in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
Cecilia and Robbie have known each other all their life; they have been 
childhood friends, they have been university acquaintances; yet, alt-
hough their friendship has “become vague and even constrained in re-
cent years” (A1 134), it is “still an old habit” (A 134), and this habbit, 
their being “old friends” (A 134), becomes “a barrier” (A 134) when Ce-
cilia and Robbie, in the library, are facing the challenge of entering a 
new stage of their relationship, of becoming lovers. They are “embar-
rassed before their former selves” (A 134). Cecilia and Robbie are highly 
self-conscious due to being aware of their former friendship, and the 
associated identity of childhood friend needs to be overcome “in order to 
become strangers on intimate terms” (A 134). Language, however, 
proves to be insufficient to overcome the awkwardness of the moment: 
they are “unable to speak” (A 134); they are beyond discussion and for 
“the moment, there seem[s] no way out with words” (A 135). In this 
specific moment, words fail them, because language is expression of 
consciousness. Consciousness denotes the linguistic state of human 
existence in which human beings are able to think about and discuss 
their identities; consequently, to overcome identity is to overcome con-
sciousness. However, with awareness being the reason for their awk-
wardness, and awareness being established in language, language can-
not be the means for Cecilia and Robbie to overcome their embarrass-
ment; eventually, with language failing them in their purpose, words are 
replaced by deeds. 
Her mouth tasted of lipstick and salt. They drew away for a second, he put his arms 
around her and they kissed again with greater confidence. Daringly, they touched the 
tips of their tongues, and it was then she made the falling, sighing sound which, he 
realised later, marked a transformation. Until that moment, there was still some-
1 A = McEwan, Ian. Atonement. 2001. London: Vintage, 2002. 
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thing ludicrous about having a familiar face so close to one’s own. They felt watched 
by their bemused childhood selves. But the contact of tongues, alive and slippery 
muscle, moist flesh on flesh, and the strange sound it drew from her, changed that. 
This sound seemed to enter him, pierce him down his length so that his whole body 
opened up and he was able to step out of himself and kiss her freely. (A 135)  
Language, basis to consciousness, causes Cecilia and Robbie’s self-
consiousness and is thus no means to overcome their embarrassment. 
Realising this deficiency of language, Cecilia and Robbie exchange timid 
initimacies; they kiss, they embrace, they kiss again “with greater confi-
dence” (A 135); yet, those intimacies are consciously exchanged: “having 
a familiar face so close to one’s own” is “ludicrous” (A 135). Sensuous-
ness is a form of initimacy which is captured by reason and thus words, 
and hence Cecilia and Robbie feel “watched by their bemused childhood 
selves” (A 135). Only when the intimacies intensify, when experiencing 
“the contact of tongues, alive and slippery muscle, moist flesh on flesh” 
(A 135), ludicrousness vanishes, and Robbie can enter a state of uncon-
sciousness leaving behind the embarrassment of former identity, for he 
is “able to step out of himself and kiss her freely” (A 135). Soon, their 
intimacies are described with verbs denoting animalistic, even violent 
and thus instinctive behaviour. Their kissing becomes a gnawing (A 135), 
and Cecilia bites Robbie, first “on the cheek, not quite playfully” (A 135), 
then, after Robbie first pulling away and then moving back, “hard on his 
lower lip” (A 135). Robbie next kisses Cecilia’s “throat, forcing back her 
head against the shelves” (A 135; emphasis added). Cecilia then pulls his 
hair and pushes “his face down against her breasts” (A 135). Their actions 
are no longer controlled and captured by reason; the sensations caused 
by their instinctive behaviour are overwhelming and extinguish any 
thought. They feel “nothing but obliterating sensation, thrilling and swell-
ing” (A 136; emphasis added). Cecilia and Robbie undergo a change 
from consciousness (conscious action guided by reason and expressed in 
language) to unconsciousness (instinctive action beyond reason and 
language); sensations cause oblivion, human instincts conquer the state 
of consciousness in which Cecilia and Robbie are aware of their identi-
ties, and thus their former identity of childhood friend stops causing em-
barrassment. “At last they were strangers, their pasts were forgotten. 
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They were also strangers to themselves who had forgotten who or where 
they were” (A 136). 
In “order to become strangers on intimate terms” (A 134), Cecilia and 
Robbie need to enter a state of unconsciousness in which they are una-
ware of former identities. This development from a state of conscious-
ness to a state of unconsciousness can be described, in Peter Zima’s 
terminology, as a development from subjectivity to individuality. Accord-
ing to his theory, it is necessary to distinguish these concepts “um die 
biologische Bedingtheit und die Naturwüchsigkeit der individuellen 
Subjektivität ins Blickfeld zu rücken” (Theorie 8). Individuality is defined 
as the natural (biologic) and unconscious state of human existence; Ce-
cilia and Robbie are individuals when their actions unconsciously origi-
nate in instinct. Subjectitvity, in contrast, is defined as the cultural (lin-
guistic) and conscious state of human existence, in which human be-
ings, due to language, are able to consciously think, speak and act, with 
the performance of speech and action giving outward evidence of subjec-
tivity. “Der Einzelne, der uns anonym auf der Straße oder in offener 
Landschaft begegnet, wird von uns als Individuum, nicht jedoch als 
Subjekt erkannt. Erst wenn er sich durch Wort und Tat zu erkennen 
gibt, nehmen wir ihn als Subjekt wahr” (Theorie 8). Subjectivity is hence 
linguistic consciousness of one’s cultural identities, for “subjectivity 
implies always a degree of thought and self-consciousness about identi-
ty” (Hall 3); first meeting in the library, Cecilia and Robbie are individual 
subjects, aware of their cultural existence and identities.  
Individuality, as biological existence, provides the basis for subjectivity, 
and, usually, the development in human existence is from natural indi-
viduality to cultural subjectivity. “Individuen [sind] zunächst Natur [...], 
die als vergängliche Basis der kulturell und sprachlich formierten Sub-
jektivität eine kontingente und äußerst prekäre Grundlage bildet” (Zi-
ma, Theorie 9). However, Cecilia and Robbie’s development exemplifies 
that subjectivity may be conquered by nature; while the state of individu-
ality becomes necessary for Cecilia and Robbie to overcome their former 
identity, may thus be considered positive, a development from subjectiv-
ity to individuality is usually considered a regression. “Krankheit als 
natürlicher Prozeß” may destroy “Subjektivität als kulturelle und sprachli-
che Erscheinung” (Theorie 8-9). Nature (be it illness or instinct) is 
deemed a threat to individual subjectivity “als Möglichkeit eines Rück-
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falls ins Bewußtlose” (Theorie 9). This threat is most prominently dis-
played in author-Briony’s vascular dementia. Author-Briony, primarily 
defining herself according to her ability of conscious thought, finally 
needs to accept her regression to individuality, to “an inferior race” (A 
356). 
The process will be slow, but my brain, my mind, is closing down. [...] loss of 
memory, short- and long-term, the disappearance of single words – simple nouns might 
be the first to go – then language itself, along with balance, and soon after, all motor 
control, and finally the autonomous nervous system. Bon voyage! (A 354-55; empha-
sis added)  
If subjectivity, conscious existence, is dependent on a human being’s 
faculty of speech, aphasia is regression to individuality, to unconscious 
existence. Individuality and subjectivity must thus be considered inter-
dependent; the individual subject is “Wechselbeziehung zwischen Indi-
vidualität als sozialer Physis und Potentialität einerseits und Subjektivität 
als Verwirklichung dieser Potentialität im Sprechen und Handeln anderer-
seits” (Theorie 21). On the one hand, individuality is the basis for subjec-
tivity while the state of subjectivity is necessary to disucss the state of 
individuality (Theorie 21-22); on the other hand, as both Cecilia and Rob-
bie’s development and author-Briony’s vascular dementia exemplify, 
individuality and subjectivity may fluently transition into each other, an 
interdependence beginning with language acquisition and ending with 
aphasia. The individual subject is “dynamische Einheit von Individualität 
und Subjektivität” (Theorie 21). 
Autonomy or Ideology?  
Identities in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
Subjectivity, defined as consiousness, allows the individual subject to 
think about and discuss its identities; thus the terms subjectivity and 
identity must not be interchangeably used: “one’s identity can be thought 
of as that particular set of traits, beliefs, and allegiances that, in short- or 
long-term ways, gives one a consistent personality and mode of social 
being” (Hall 3), while subjectivity “as a critical concept invites us to con-
sider the question of how and from where identity arises, to what extent 
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it is understandable, and to what degree it is something over which we 
have any measure of influence or control” (3-4). The specific shaping of 
subjectivity in the form of identities is changeable. Each individual sub-
ject “may have numerous discrete identities, of race, class, gender, sexu-
al orientation, etc., and a subjectivity that is comprised of all those fac-
ets” (134). Subjectivity is constant “negotiation with broad cultural defi-
nitions and our own ideals” (134), and each individual subject may adopt 
various identities (simultaneously or successively).  
Identity is hence, thus Zima applying Greimas’s actantial model to the 
individual subject’s quest for identity, “das Objekt des fühlenden, 
denkenden, sprechenden und handelnden Subjekt-Aktanten” (Theorie 
24); lover is the identity Cecilia and Robbie have decided to adopt. A cru-
cial question, however, is arising from this statement: to what extent, if 
at all, is the individual subject able to freely choose its identities? The 
individual subject “konstituiert sich im Diskurs, indem es auf andere 
Diskurse imitativ oder dialogisch-polemisch reagiert [...]. Seine Identität 
als spechendes und handelndes Subjekt kommt im Diskurs als narrati-
vem Programm zustande” (Theorie 15); however, with the individual sub-
ject’s behaviour being rather monologically imitative than dialogically 
polemic, it is consistent to acknowledge “Überdeterminierung des Ein-
zelnen und der Gruppe durch Sprache und Gesellschaft” (Theorie 15). 
The individual subject is discursively determined. 
Zumeist läuft diese Überdeterminierung darauf hinaus, daß Subjekte in bestimm-
ten religiösen, politischen oder wissenschaftlichen Soziolekten aufgehen. Der Sozio-
lekt kann als ein Ensemble von wirklichen oder potentiellen Dikursen definiert werden, die 
von einem gemeinsamen lexikalischen Repertoire und einer gemeinsamen semantischen 
Grundlage, d.h. von bestimmten Relevanzkriterien, Klassifikationen (Taxonomien) und 
Definitionen, ausgehen. Da der Einzelne zumeist keine eigenen Relevanzkriterien 
kennt, orientiert er sich, um seine Ansichten und Interessen artikulieren zu können, 
am Vokabular und an der Semantik eines oder mehrerer Soziolekte. (Theorie 16)  
Ideological discourses offer, by means of classification, simplification in 
reducing the complexity of existence; hence, in aligning itself to ideolog-
ical discourses, the individual subject can rely on binary definition and 
clearly distinguish right from wrong values (good vs. bad, beautiful vs. 
ugly) and ideas (proletariat vs. bourgeoisie, evolution vs. creation). The 
individual subject “bewältigt die gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit, indem es 
bestimmte semantische Gegensätze und Unterschiede für relevant er-
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klärt” (Theorie 16); thus it is made capapble of action. Emily, Cecilia’s 
mother, having been brought up by Victorians (A 50), sustains the Victo-
rian binary opposition of public and private sphere and the associated 
female identities of mother and housewife. Emily critises, almost con-
dems, her daughther for having read English literature at Girton Col-
lege, because her education does not benefit, is even counterproductive 
to her finding a husband. 
One day he [Emily’s son Leon] might bring home a friend for Cecilia to marry, if 
three years at Girton had not made her an impossible prospect [...]. [...] They weren’t 
even awarding girls proper degrees.2 When Cecilia came home in July with her fi-
nals’ result – the nerve of the girl to be disappointed with it! – she had no job or skill 
and still had a husband to find and motherhood to confront [...]. (A 64-65) 
She considers Cecilia “too wrapped up in herself, too much the intellec-
tual to bother with children” (A 66), to perform simple errands (A 67) 
and her duties as hostess (A 70); it is impossible for Emily to accept a 
subjectivity that is comprised of mother, housewife and intellectual. Exactly 
this ambivalently comprised subjectivity, however, is Cecilia’s subjectivi-
ty, and the binary opposition obvious in Emily’s thought is exposed as 
simplification.  
Emily, despite clearly distinguishing between right identities (mother and 
housewife) and wrong identity (intellectual), is incapable of the actions 
associated with her right identities. “Illness had stopped her giving her 
children all a mother should. Sensing this, they had always called her by 
her first name” (A 66); instead, Cecilia and Leon have been brought up 
by Robbie’s mother (A 87-88). When she sets out to soothe her house-
hold (A 70) or be the hostess (A 102), she is incapable of doing so with-
out Cecilia’s assistance (A 102-04); indeed, whenever “Mrs Tallis exer-
cised authority in the absence of her husband, the children felt obliged 
to protect her from seeming ineffectual” (A 127-28). Ideological distinc-
tion does not necessarily guarantee the individual subject’s ability to act, 
especially with nature in the form of illness denying action, especially 
with new ideologies occurring and casting first doubt; her husband, 
considered the authority in Emily’s thought (A 153-54), encourages and 
expects Cecilia’s (financial) independence (A 103, 107). Only when Rob-
 
2 Women attending the University of Cambridge “had to wait until 1948 before they were 
given membership of the University” (McWilliams-Tullberg 13).  
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bie is accused of raping Cecilia’s younger cousin Lola, Emily becomes 
decisive. “As for their mother, untypically she rose to the crisis, free of 
migraine and the need to be alone. She actually grew as her older daugh-
ter shrank into private misery” (A 175); she becomes capable of acting 
because she is strongly confirmed in her notion of right and wrong and 
the futility of female education in distinguishing so. Having read Rob-
bie’s sexually explicit letter, to everyone proving his guilt, she accuses 
her daughter of negligence. “If you had done the right thing, young lady, 
with all your education, and come to me with this, then something could 
have been done in time and your cousin would have been spared her 
nightmare” (A 179; emphasis added). Cecilia’s education, according to 
Emily, does not grant her the superiority of mind Emily accuses her 
daughther of feeling (A 152); on the contrary, her education is proven to 
be insignificant for it does not assist (even prevents) Cecilia in making 
“correct” decisions. Cecilia is held partially at fault for Robbie’s crime, 
and when she finally, in his defence, accounts their consensual intima-
cies in the library, her account is considered “far more shocking than 
Briony’s” version (A 181); apart from her account confirming the general 
opinion of Robbie being a “morbidly over-sexed” and thus dangerous 
man (A 181, 204), Cecilia, having consented to premarital sexual inter-
course, cannot be considered a powerless victim. Emily’s prejudgement 
is, on the one hand, based on her socially still valid Victorian attitude 
toward sexuality; on the other hand, it is based on the social distinction 
of class, another binary opposition (upper vs. middle vs. working class) 
prominent in Emily’s ideologically structured thought. She considers 
Robbie “a hobby of Jack’s, living proof of some levelling principle” her 
husband has “pursued through the years” (A 151; emphasis added); 
indeed, criticising Robbie’s education, which she thinks unreasonable 
considering his social status, is the only line of thought making her (at 
least momentarily) side with Cecilia. Emily has always opposed her hus-
band financing Robbie’s education, thinking it “unfair on Leon and the 
girls” (A 151), and she does not consider herself in the “wrong simply 
because Robbie had come away from Cambridge with a first. In fact, it 
had made things harder for Cecilia with her third, though it was prepos-
terous of her to pretend to be disappointed. Robbie’s elevation” (A 151-
51). According to her, Robbie, though exceptionally bright still merely a 
son to servants and properly placed as physically hard-working gardener, 
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has even less claim to university education than her daughter. Her bina-
ry distinction, however, is criticised in Cecilia admiring both Robbie’s 
physical strength and strong intellect, admiring this ambivalent but 
“interesting combination in a man, intelligence and sheer bulk” (A 25-6). 
Emily’s simplification due to binary thought and thus binary thought 
itself is equally criticised in Robbie being inncocent and the wealthy and 
finally titled Paul Marshall, whose chemical skills Emily admires (A 
152), being the culprit. Being ideologically determined, Emily can clearly 
position herself in society and consequently positions her fellow human 
beings in determining their identities; a process, however, which is 
shown to be restrictive, for Cecilia is depicted as having adopted all three 
identities of intellectual, housewife and mother. Leon does not even pre-
tend to understand her comparison of Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and 
John Milton’s Paradise Lost (A 109), and when she tells him about “their 
mother’s desire for a miracle at the feast – roast potato into potato salad” 
(A 109), Leon does “not take the biblical reference” (A 109); her educa-
tion has indeed made her his intellectual superior. Nevertheless, she is 
not only very capaple of keeping the peace between Emily and her serv-
ants without humiliating her mother (A 105), she is equally able to suc-
cessfully deal with children (A 101-02). This ambivalence of identities, 
which must not be considered possible in Emily’s thought in order to 
classify existence, indicates a new understanding of subjectivity and 
ideology in crisis.  
Ideological discourses are sustained in the simplification of binary defi-
nition; hence, an ideology’s crisis originates in the disclosure of ambiva-
lence and the unveiled complexity of existence when right and wrong 
become difficult to separate and apparently conflicting identities like 
mother, housewife and intellectual become different facets of one individu-
al subject’s subjectivity. Ambivalence is prominently promoted in Frie-
drich Nietzsche’s Jenseits von Gut und Böse (1886). Nietzsche “actually 
denies that the distinction between good and evil can be made at all, and 
suggests that the very same quality that is considered evil from one per-
spective may at least as accurately be characterized as good from anoth-
er” (Nehamas 211). Truth depends on perspective and thus binary oppo-
sitions are severely criticised in Nietzsche’s line of thought. 
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Man darf nämlich zweifeln, erstens, ob es Gegensätze überhaupt gibt, und zweitens, 
ob jene volkstümlichen Wertschätzungen und Wert-Gegensätze, auf welche die Me-
taphysiker ihr Siegel gedrückt haben, nicht vielleicht nur Vordergrunds-
Schätzungen sind, nur vorläufige Perspektiven […]. Bei allem Werte, der dem Wah-
ren, dem Wahrhaftigen, dem Selbstlosen zukommen mag: es wäre möglich, daß 
dem Scheine, dem Willen zur Täuschung, dem Eigennutz und der Begierde ein für 
alles Leben höherer und grundsätzlicherer Wert zugeschrieben werden müßte. Es 
wäre sogar noch möglich, daß was den Wert jener guten und verehrten Dinge aus-
macht, gerade darin bestünde, mit jenen schlimmen, scheinbar entgegengesetzten 
Dingen auf verfängliche Weise verwandt, verknüpft, verhäkelt, vielleicht gar wesens-
gleich zu sein. Vielleicht! - Aber wer ist Willens, sich um solche gefährliche Viel-
leichts zu kümmern! (8-9) 
Nietzsche proposes the acceptance of ambivalence and thus denies the 
simplification of ideological thought. He “engages in a process of forth-
right consciousness raising that is clearly intended to inculcate a greater 
degree of personal agency and the taking of responsibility for one’s ac-
tion in the process of self-creation” (Hall 70). Ambivalence, however, is 
not only a major tool of ideological criticism; facing the overwhelming 
complexity of existence, the individual subject is deprived of its possibil-
ity to clearly position itself in (moral, i.e. ideological) space “[und wird] 
von der Ambivalenz als Krise erfaßt” (Zima, Theorie 19). Ambivalence 
primarily causes an individual subject’s existential crisis, “weil seine 
diskursive und ideologische Identität radikal in Frage gestellt wird” 
(Theorie 19). Those individual subjects longing for simplicity, clarity and 
security and thus being unable to accept ambivalence will align them-
selves to a new ideology and will continue to think in binary oppositions 
in order to remain capable of acting (Lit. Subjekt 8). Those accepting 
ambivalence obtain a means to counter ideological determination. 
Wenn unvereinbare Werte wie Gut und Böse, Freiheit und Unfreiheit, Liebe und 
Haß, Wahrheit und Lüge zusammengeführt werden, so entsteht einerseits ein Kri-
senbewußtsein, welches das individuelle Subjekt handlungsunfähig machen kann; 
andererseits kann aber der kritische Gedanke aufkommen, daß Gegensätze dialek-
tisch zusammengedacht werden sollten, auch wenn die Hegelsche Synthese nicht 
mehr zu bewerkstelligen ist. [...]. […]; es [das individuelle Subjekt] wird zugleich ge-
stärkt, weil es jenseits von allen religiösen und ideologischen Manichäismen und 
Dualismen beobachten kann, wie sehr Gegensätze zusammenhängen. (Lit. Subjekt 
6) 
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Ambivalence is not only reason for crises but also basis to criticism, and 
active criticism becomes the basis to a more complex and stronger sub-
jectivity.  
Ambivalenz löst nicht nur eine Krise aus, sondern bewirkt auch Kritik am ideologi-
schen Soziolekt, der das Individuum lange Jahre hindurch zum sprechenden und 
handelnden Subjekt machte. Das Subjekt distanziert sich reflexiv (selbstkritisch) von 
seiner eigenen Subjektivität und versucht, sich als sprechende und handelnde In-
stanz neu zu orientieren. […] Dies führt dazu, daß ein und dasselbe Individuum in 
der Lage ist, verschiedene ideologische Identitäten – nacheinander oder auch parallel 
– kritisch und selbstkritisch zu reflektieren und zu relativieren [...]. (Theorie 19, 21) 
Instead of monologically accepting ideological and thus reduced 
thought, the individual subject enters into dialogue with various identi-
ties and values. It is thus appropriate to signify a change of subjectivity 
by means of crisis and criticism. Monological subjectivity is conscious-
ness by ideology; the identities of the individual subject are externally 
determined, not internally chosen; Emily is an individual subject having 
monological consciousness. Dialogical subjectivity is consciousness 
about ideology; the identities of the individual subject are partly internal-
ly chosen, because ideological discourse is recognised in its simplifying 
and constructing function. The individual subject in crisis might either 
despair or engage in permanent dialogue with external forces and thus 
become a flexible subject that changes its identities with every critical 
thought and is hence able to sustain its autonomy: “nur noch Ideologen 
als große Vereinfacher [können] eindeutig Gut und Böse bezeichnen” 
(Lit. Subjekt 7). Cecilia and Robbie, it will be discussed, are both facing 
dialogical subjectivity but differ in the degree of accepting ambivalence, 
while author-Briony, who realises the value of ambivalence, finally re-
jects ambivalence and dialogue in order to atone and be forgiven.  
Monologue or Dialogue? 
Transfixing Ambivalence in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
In the beginning, neither Cecilia nor Robbie are ideologist simplifying 
existence; however, while Cecilia, facing ambivalence, is incapable of 
accepting dialogical subjectivity and is thus transfixed in her existential 
crisis, Robbie welcomes ambivalence as unchaining process by which he 
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understands Cecilia’s existential crisis and accepts her ambivalence. 
Cecilia’s first “entrance” displays a young woman rife with impatience. 
Partly because of her youth and the glory of the day, partly because of her blossom-
ing need for a cigarette, Cecilia Tallis half ran with her flowers along the path [...]. 
The accumulated inactivity of the summer weeks since finals also hurried her along; 
since coming home, her life had stood still, and a fine day like this made her impatient, 
almost desperate. (A 18; emphasis added) 
Cecilia’s impatience originates in her highly unsatisfactory situation. 
Since having left Girton College and returned home, her life has lacked 
all movement; this absence of movement sharply contrasts her life at 
Cambridge which has been lively and adventurous for less conventional. 
Emily’s account of Cecilia’s college days, flouting in tone, confirms Ce-
cilia having adopted the identity of female student respectively intellectual 
her mother finds fault with; Emily does not only criticise “all the self-
adoring slumming, the knickers drying before the electric fire and two to 
a hairbrush” but also “the cosy jargon of Cecilia’s Cambridge – the Halls, 
the Maids’ Dancing, the Little-Go” (A 64; emphasis added). Cecilia’s life 
at Cambridge has been unconventional. She has attended lectures, has 
taken examinations, has socialised beyond her mother’s approval and 
has, living in a residence, “publicly” dried her underwear. Cecilia identi-
fies with a language typical for English students (Halls, Little-Go), and 
her mother, describing her jargon as cosy intending to ridicule it, actually 
implies that Cecilia has not only pretended to live and enjoy the life of a 
female student but that she has felt comfortable and welcome at Cam-
bridge. Cecilia is determined by the new ideology of female education 
and thus independence and equality emerging at the end of the 19th 
century with the first women colleges being founded in Cambridge and 
Oxford; hence she aligns herself to the sociolect of this ideology. Coming 
home, however, Cecilia is confronted with her mother’s disapproval. 
Emily asserts that “women at the ‘Varsity, [is] childish really, at best an 
innocent lark, like the girls’ rowing eight, a little posturing alongside 
their brothers dressed up in the solemnity of social progress” (A 64-65). 
Using Cecilia’s colloquial term varsity (instead of university), a term 
strange to her own sociolect, Emily continues to ridicule her daughter’s 
jargon; she considers female social progress in education a masquerade 
proposing status unfounded in reality; women are merely “posturing 
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alongside their brothers” instead of standing equally besides them. Ce-
cilia, coming home, is hence confronted with the expectations her moth-
er considers appropriate for a woman and consequently faces a conflict 
typical for women at the beginning of the 20th century. 
College-educated women pioneered in this drive toward greater female autonomy, 
seeking out new jobs, forming new institutions, and playing an increasingly im-
portant role in the public sphere. Yet even as they took up professional careers, most 
women felt a deep conflict between the old social expectations of marriage and chil-
dren, and the new opportunities for independence and personal fulfilment. They were 
caught between old ideologies and behavior patterns and new ambitions and public careers. 
(Vicinus 603; emphasis added)  
Facing her mother’s differently determined thought, Cecilia is forced to 
re-think her identities. Indeed, her mother’s expectations are not even 
appalling to her; on the contrary, when she is required in her identity as 
housewife, she is very capable of acting (A 105). Furthermore, she has 
always most successfully dealt with Briony; when meeting her agitated 
sister in the hall, Cecilia attempts to resuce her once again from self-
destruction (A 44). Cecilia has always mothered Briony. “When she was 
small and prone to nightmares – those terrible screams in the night – 
Cecilia used to go to her room and wake her. [...] And then she would 
carry her into her own bed” (A 44). Cecilia even realises that comforting 
Briony would re-restablish clarity in identity and thus control. “Such 
stroking and soothing murmurs would have been a release for Cecilia 
after a frustrating day whose various cross-currents of feelings she had 
preferred not to examine. Addressing Briony’s problems with kind 
words and caresses would have restored a sense of control” (A 44). An 
individual subject’s identity is dependent on acceptance. Emily, like 
Cecilia, is dependent on Briony’s need to be mothered in order to be 
confirmed in her identity: to love Briony is “to be soothed” (A 65); both, 
however, mother and sister-mother are denied this confirmation. Emily 
realises that Briony will soon be gone from her (A 4), and Cecilia 
acknowledges that Briony has grown independent when she wants to 
comfort her sister, hearing “the neediness” of being needed “in her own 
voice” (A 44), but recognises “an element of autonomy in the younger 
girl’s unhappiness” (A 44). Crucially, although sharing the same long-
ing, Emily denies Cecilia’s motherly traits (A 66), she needs to deny 
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them, for accepting and approving Cecilia’s motherly qualities threatens 
Emily’s position within her family with Cecilia replacing her own moth-
er in her motherly function; indeed, she already has been replaced, for 
Cecilia and Leon have been brought up by Robbie’s mother, Briony by 
Cecilia. The “proper” family constellation is only restored, the threat 
Cecilia poses to Emily is only diminished when Cecilia, facing her fami-
ly’s prejudgement of Robbie, becomes unable to organise the necessary 
actions and comfort of Briony and Lola (A 175-79); her failure, however, 
is assurance to Emily, and thus she grows while Cecilia shrinks into 
private misery (A 175). At the same time, Emily cannot promote Cecilia’s 
intellectuality and independence, for promoting Cecilia’s identity as 
intellectual in order to strenghthen her position and function within her 
family would be threatening to the ideology her existence is based upon. 
Cecilia, may she acccept her mother’s expectations based on the Victori-
an ideology of public and private sphere or the expectations originating 
in the new ideology of female independence in the public sphere, is a 
danger to Emily’s identities and existence; thus are not only Cecilia’s 
wrong capabilities criticised but also her right capabilities denied. 
Cecilia, although her mother’s expectations are not appalling to her, 
feels the injustice of her situation. “Her mother had always lived in an 
invalid’s shadow land, Briony had always required mothering from her 
elder sister, and Leon had always floated free” (A 103; emphasis added); 
repeating the adverb always implies Cecilia’s dissatisfaction with her 
situation. Having studied at Girton College, Cecilia cannot simply stop 
being the intellectual, and reducing her existence to domestic duties 
lacks challenges she requires. 
She had not thought it would be so easy to slip back into the old roles. Cambridge 
had changed her fundamentally and she thought she was immune. No one in her 
family, however, noticed the transformation in her, and she was not able to resist the 
power of their habitual expectations. [...] Now it was time for her to move on. She 
needed an adventure. (A 103)  
Her father even expects her to find a job (A 103, 107); thus she is not 
only torn between her mother’s and her own expectations but also be-
tween her mother’s and her father’s expectations. Realising the unrest 
her experience at Cambridge, her transformation is causing her, Cecilia 
even envies Leon’s “blandness” that is not only “perfectly tolerable” but 
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“even soothing” (A 108): “she needed him, she wanted a share in his 
freedom” (A 107). Freedom is not known to Cecilia while staying at 
home; and yet, freedom to her is both necessary and dangerous. 
She could not remain here, she knew she should make plans, but she did nothing. 
There were various possibilities, all equally unpressing. She had a little money in her 
account, enough to keep her modestly for a year or so. Leon repeatedly invited her to 
spend time with him in London. University friends were offering to help her find a 
job – a dull one certainly, but she would have her independence. (A 21) 
Leaving, Cecilia knows, offering at least some freedom, is necessary to 
her mental and emotional well-being. “She could not remain here, she 
knew she should make plans” (A 21; emphasis added); the use of the 
conjunctive mood, however, already indicates the speculative nature of 
her plans. Furthermore, all prospects of leaving are “equally unpressing” 
(A 21) because they do not offer the long-term security (in identity) a 
family offers. 
No one was holding Cecilia back, no one would care particularly if she left. It wasn’t 
torpor that kept her – she was often restless to the point of irritability. She simply 
liked to feel that she was prevented from leaving, that she was needed. [...] In fact, the 
thought of packing a suitcase and taking the morning train did not excite her. Leav-
ing for leaving’s sake. (A 21-22; emphasis added) 
Cecilia’s domestic existence lacks significance, for the servants are reso-
lute and capable of managing the household without superior assistance 
(A 104-05), Briony has grown up; nevertheless, although no one would 
recognise her absence, she longs to be needed, to be accepted, to be 
welcome. She has “come to be with the family, and make amends for 
being away” (A 109). Having a bad conscience about studying and leav-
ing her family and feeling the need to make amends for her absence 
displays her being still determined by Emily’s ideologies; thus, although 
her using the family instead of her family already implies her 
enstrangement, and although admitting that she has found “her parents 
and sister absent in their different ways” (A 109), whenever she decides 
to leave (A 102, 103), her decision is soon changed to the contrary; being 
invited by Leon and accepting his invitation, even when accepting she 
imagines “herself being dragged back, incapable of packing her bag or of 
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making the train” (A 110). The result is devastating. “I am going a little 
mad here” (A 107), she admits to Leon, and when accounting her past 
weeks, there is desperation in all she says, “an emptiness at its core” (A 
109).  
Being torn between staying and leaving, between family and independ-
ence, between security and adventure, between “old” and “new” expecta-
tions, Cecilia, during her first “entrance,” only half runs (A 18); even her 
movement displays indecisiveness. Cecilia is living an existential crisis, 
unable to decide for the narrative programme of either old or new ideol-
ogy, being aware of the simplification she would admit to in deciding: 
she is tired of “defending, defining, attacking” (A 26). She feels the iden-
tities’ equality, she is yet, however, unable to accept the identities’ am-
bivalence and thus to promote activity in dialogical subjectivity; instead 
of choosing all identities or at least entering into dialogue with all their 
ideas and values, she prefers not deciding to deciding. This lack of 
movement results in her restlessness, impatience and desperation; only 
nature offers her rest. “Dripping coolly onto her sandalled feet, the unti-
dy bunch of rose-bay willow-herb and irises brought her to a better state 
of mind” (A 20). Nature is an ambivalent environment in which binary 
oppositions (e.g. flora and fauna) dialogically correspond. Feeling water 
on her skin, Cecilia’s “feverish” mind is cooled. Neither is she soothed 
because in nature her contradictory emotions and thoughts are recon-
ciled nor because nature causes freedom in blandness; she is soothed 
because nature as environment of ambivalence offers freedom in not 
requiring decision and offering acceptance of diversity. Water is an ele-
ment repeatedly related to Cecilia; indeed, water in particular helps Rob-
bie understand Cecilia’s existential crisis and accept her ambivalence. 
Monologue or Dialogue?                                                                            
Unchaining Ambivalence in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
When she emerged a few seconds later with a piece of pottery in each hand, he knew 
better than to offer to help her out of the water. The frail white nymph, from whom 
water cascaded far more successfully than it did from the beefy Triton, carefully 
placed the pieces by the vase. (A 30; emphasis added) 
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A nymph is a fictional character with extensive literary tradition, and 
Robbie’s “literary” act of comparing Cecilia to a nymph offers several 
interesting insights into Cecilia’s identities, her subjectivity and her 
relationship with Robbie. Interfigurality, focussing on the “interrelations 
that exist between characters of different texts” (Müller 101), is “one of 
the most important dimensions of intertextuality” (101); intertextuality 
(in the form of intentional reference), in turn, is necessary to an individ-
ual subject’s identity construction. 
Seit der Klassik, der Romantik und dem Realismus erfüllen Intertextualität und Zitat 
die Aufgabe, die Position des erzählenden Subjekts und die Identität der handelnden 
Subjekte zu stärken. Es geht u.a. darum, die Ideologie des Erzählers und des Helden 
zu erläutern oder gar zu rechtfertigen [...]. (Zima, Lit. Subjekt 207) 
Intertextuality is thus means to promote ideology and support ideologi-
cal determination; however, with ambivalence and arbitrariness unveiled 
and perspectivism promoted in the new sciences (C. Darwin, A. Ein-
stein, K. Marx, F. de Saussure), psychologies (S. Freud, W. James) and 
especially philosophies (H. Bergson, F. Nietzsche) emerging at the turn 
of the century, intertextuality, though certainly not exclusively, becomes 
a major tool of ideological criticism.  
[Es ist] eine Verschiebung zugunsten der Kritik, insbesondere der Sprach- und Ideo-
logiekritik, feststellbar. Diese Hervorhebung modernistischer Kritik soll keineswegs 
die gesellschaftskritische Ausrichtung der Romantik (Shelley) oder des Realismus 
(Keller, Spielhagen, Galdós) verdecken, sondern an die Akzentverschiebung  zu-
gunsten der Kritik erinnern, die eine der fundamentalen Ambivalenzen des Moder-
nismus begründet: den oft aporetischen Versuch, die ideologischen Grundlagen der Sub-
jektivität radikal zu kritisieren und zugleich das Subjekt gegen die es bedrohenden Auflö-
sungstendenzen zu verteidigen. (209) 
Comparing Cecilia to a nymph promotes the importance of ambivalence 
and dialogical subjectivity and thus offers criticism of ideologically de-
termined identities based on binary classification. 
In Greek mythology, nymphs are distinguished according to their dwell-
ings: nymphs of the mountains (oreads), nymphs of the trees (dryads), 
nymphs of the springs, rivers and ponds (naiads) and nymphs of the sea 
(okeanids and nereids) (Hansen 241-3). Nymphs are “youthful and lovely 
in aspect” and live “a life of freedom in one of the uncultivated places of 
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the earth, away from human habitation” (239). Although Robbie does 
not compare Cecilia to a specific nymph, she rises in front of Triton and 
is thus associated with a nymph of the sea; furthermore, nereids are fa-
mous for their rosebud faces (Monaghan 217), and Robbie, recalling the 
events by the fountain, thinks of Cecilia’s “glistening rosebud mouth” (A 
79; emphasis added). Comparing Cecilia to a nereid allows for the dis-
cussion of her mental and social confinement. A nereid swimming in the 
natural sea, being thus farthest away from human habitation as possible 
and untainted by social expectations, conveys unlimited freedom in am-
bivalence; in contrast, however, a nymph of the sea limited to an artificial 
fountain, an ornament cultivating and restraining water and its inhabit-
ants, associates imprisonment. Cecilia’s mental and social confinement, 
originating in “unnatural” expectations denying her diversity, is indicat-
ed in comparing her to a nymph of the sea reduced to a fountain. Fur-
thermore, running water indicates freedom and movement; yet, stag-
nant water, quite the reverse, indicates decay. Triton “could blow 
through his conch a jet only two inches high, the pressure was so feeble, 
and water fell back over his head, [...] leaving a glistening dark green 
stain” (A 18; emphasis added). Cecilia, torn between staying and moving, 
only half runs; equally, the jet of water is only two inches high causing 
the water to be half-stagnant; movement is feeble, reduced to a mini-
mum. Moreover, the dark green stain is indicative of first decay. If Cecil-
ia remains indecisive and incabable of moving, she, too, will decay, will 
go mad.  
Water, however, is equally a symbol for life, birth and re-birth (Stamer 
10); Cecilia, plunging into the fountain’s water, re-emerging a few se-
conds later and thus breaking the surface twice causing the half-stagnant 
water to move, is recognised in her diversity. Nymphs are highly ambiva-
lent in behaviour; especially nereids are usually “lovely in appearance and 
generally kindly to humans” (Hansen 243), but nymphs can become 
dangerous if approached too closely by humans (Coenen 153). Moreover, 
a nymph’s “sexuality tends to the extremes of overindulgence or under-
indulgence” (Hansen 240). She thus combines facets of the binary dis-
tinguished femme fragile and femme fatale, the former a-sexual and frail, 
gentle and benevolent, the latter sensual, passionate, erotic and deadly 
dangerous. Rethinking the events by the fountain, Robbie relishes the 
contradictory facets in Cecilia’s air, complexion and behaviour. The 
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“startling whiteness” (A 79) recalls the “frail white nymph” rising from 
the water (A 30). Whiteness and frailty are traditionally associated with 
femme fragiles; yet, Robbie’s description is complimented by observing “a 
glimpse of the triangular darkness her knickers were supposed to con-
ceal” (A 79), “the deep curve of her waist” (A 79) and her pelvic bones 
stretching “the material clear of her skin” (A 79); “a simple daisy, sewn 
between the cups of her bra” is associated with Cecilia’s “breasts wide 
apart and small” (A 79). Frailty and innocence do not foreclose eroti-
cism. Robbie acknowledges and admires both Cecilia’s cool “marmore-
al” complexion and her fiery sensual features. There is “something 
carved and still about the face” but also “a wild flare to the nostrils” (A 
79); her rosebud mouth is small, but full and glistening (A 79); her 
“statuesque look” (A 79-80) hides complex emotions and thoughts, for 
her eyes are “dark and contemplative” (A 79), her movements “quick and 
impatient” (A 80). In comparing Cecilia to a nymh, Robbie accepts Cecil-
ia in her amvivalent femininity. 
Ambivalent femininity is equally implied in Cecilia associating her ap-
pearance with a mermaid. Having finally decided on her green evening 
dress, it is a mermaid who rises “to meet her in her full-length mirror” 
(A 99). Mermaids can be distinguished into various sub-categories, each 
presenting a specific aspect of complex femininity. Some mermaids 
primarily display motherly traits (Stamer 31-3); others suggest seduction 
and infatuation (33-5); still others ensure love and felicity (35-7); some 
are in need of salvation (37-41). “So vielgestaltig wie das Wasser selbst, 
schillernd-schön, aber auch dunkel-dämonisch, treten uns die weibli-
chen Wassergestalten aus den Märchen und Sagen entgegen” (9). This 
diversity, thus Barbara Stamer continues, only at first appears contradic-
tory.  
Diese verwirrende Vielfalt von Wasser-Frauen scheint zunächst nicht zusammenzu-
gehören, ja sie widerspricht sich. Sehen wir die Wasserfrauen jedoch in phänomeno-
logischem Zusammenhang, so wird deutlich, daß sie alle Ausdruck einer großen 
zentralen Gestalt sind: die der Großen Mutter. Die vielen verschiedenen Figuren stel-
len nur Teilaspekte des Großen Weiblichen in seiner Ambivalenz dar. (9; bold empha-
sis added) 
Cecilia, though unnoticed, dialogically combines different “mermaidian” 
and thus feminine features in her individual subjectivity; she displays 
motherly care, ensures love and is in need of salvation; furthermore, she 
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seduces and infatuates Robbie. A further feminine characteristic, intel-
lectuality, is added. Cecilia’s complex femininity is confirmed when the 
intellectual and the mother finally become co-existing facets of her indi-
vidual subjectivity. The dress Cecilia is wearing is her “post-finals gown” 
(A 98), worn to celebrate her concluded education; at the same time, she 
is wearing this gown when caring for Jackson and Pierrot (A 99-101). 
Crucially, when wearing the dress, she feels “sleekly impregnable, slip-
pery and secure” (A 99). She is immune to expectations, to determined 
identity and reduced personality; she feels sleekly and slipperily and is 
finally able to elude simplification; sleekness and slipperiness, usually 
considered dangerous, are Cecilia’s safeguard, offer Cecilia the security 
she is longing for. 
Significantly, Cecilia’s motherly aspects are equally valuable to Robbie 
than to Briony or the twins. On his way to Dunkirk, Robbie remembers 
Cecilia’s letters. 
She was now on the maternity ward, and every day brought commonplace miracles, 
as well as moments of drama or hilarity. […] When she described a happy outcome, 
that moment when the battle was over and an exhausted mother took the child in 
her arms for the first time, and gazed in rapture into a new face, it was the unspoken 
call to Cecilia’s own future, the one she would share with him, which gave the writ-
ing its simple power […]. (A 207) 
She is directly involved in giving birth and protecting life. Cecilia “trägt 
Merkmale des Archetyps der Guten Mutter, welche die Gebärende, 
Schöpferische, Erhaltend-Schützende ist” (Stamer 31). At the same time, 
describing her routine to Robbie, she also protects him from despair in 
foreshadowing their joined future. Facing desolation and death, Cecilia’s 
ability to give birth and thus to add a new identity (father) to Robbie’s 
individual subjectivity, which has been reduced to acronyms and num-
bers in the army (A 206) and thus been wiped “clean” of all individual 
personality, maintains his desire to live; admittedly, this desire is equally 
maintained considering another aspect of Cecilia’s femininity, her sexu-
al attraction, for “in truth, his thoughts [dwell] less on birth than concep-
tion” (A 207). However, Cecilia and Robbie’s relationship is not reduced 
to the loving mermaid, “die aus dem Wasser auftaucht und dem 
Geliebten Glück und Erfüllung schenkt” (Stamer 35); when emerging 
from the fountain, Cecilia, due to her existential crisis in need of salva-
Barbara Kehler 
 
 86 
tion, is not only offering love to Robbie but is equally dependent on 
Robbie’s acceptance and support. Mermaids usually lack souls and only 
“die Liebe eines menschlichen Gemahls kann sie von […] der seelenlo-
sen Existenz erlösen” (37). Cecilia, though not lacking a soul, is lacking 
subjectivity: she is capable of thinking about her identities but unable to 
act; only Robbie is realising Cecilia’s confinement and restlessness (A 
80) and is finally offering salvation in accepting her ambivalent subjec-
tivity.  
Monologue or Dialogue?                                                                         
Convenient Ambivalence in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
The previous analysis might have given the impression that the compar-
ison of Cecilia to a nymph originates in Robbie’s thought, the compari-
son of Cecilia to a mermaid in her own; the structure of McEwan’s nov-
el, however, explains the origin of these comparisons in author-Briony’s 
thought.3 These comparisons, one might hence conclude, are thus pur-
posefully employed to atone for her younger self’s false testimony. In-
deed, making Cecilia and Robbie’s relationship a relationship of love 
based on the acceptance of ambivalence and reciprocal salvation elevates 
the relationship she has destroyed; furthermore, depicting Cecilia as life-
giving and protecting mother and thus sharply contrasting her with 
Emily’s failure elevates her sister and consequently the man she has 
chosen to love against Emily’s expectations of class-based marriage (A 
152). Exploiting the ambivalent characteristics asscociated with nymphs 
and mermaids, however, author-Briony equally self-justifies her younger 
self’s actions.  
Robbie’s infatuation makes him think and behave like an addict. Expect-
ing Cecilia’s anger when attending the dinner, he concludes: “It would 
be worse, but he still wanted it. He had to have it. He wanted it to be 
worse” (A 81); he then decides to apologise and types the fateful letter 
before he can stop himself (A 85-86). A mermaid, especially in the form of 
a siren, is seductive and deadly dangerous in causing infatuation and 
 
3 McEwan’s meta-fictional chapter concluding his novel by the name of Atonement and 
casting new light on author-Briony’s autobiographical novel allows for the “experimental” 
and rather “provoking” line of thoughts that an author’s intention can be (fully) known to 
anyone besides herself and that the author and her narrator can be identified.   
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obsession (Stamer 33). Men stricken by such a mermaid are occasionally 
considered to behave maniacally (Coenen 153), and Emily, after dinner, 
recalls “something manic and glazed in his look” (A 151); not knowing 
about Robbie’s experiences in the library, she even suspects him of 
“smoking the reefers” (A 151). Author-Briony thus establishes Cecilia’s 
femme fatale identity the reason for Robbie being classified, due to his 
infatuated behaviour (the letter, the library), a maniac (A 119, 151); 
hence she indirectly blames Cecilia for young Briony’s false testimony 
that is based on Robbie’s “abnormal” conduct. This transfer of guilt is 
equally indicated during Cecilia and Robbie’s intimate encounter in the 
library when author-Briony makes Robbie think that Cecilia “might not 
be shrinking from him, but drawing him with her deeper into the 
gloom” (A 133). A siren seduces and kills a man, “[indem sie ihn] in die 
Tiefe zieht und in ihr unterirdisches Reich lockt, ihn mit ihrer Schön-
heit und ihrem Gesang betört” (Stamer 33). Comparing Cecilia to a 
mermaid and stressing this mermaid’s behaviour fatal to men diminish-
es young Briony’s guilt; yet, torn between atonement and self-
justification, ambivalence prevails, for Cecilia has difficulties to articu-
late. “He heard a soft, wet sound, the kind that is made when one is 
about to speak and the tongue unglues from the roof of the mouth. But 
she said nothing” (A 133). It is the mermaid’s seductive voice usually 
causing a man’s destruction (Stamer 33), hence its absence diminishes 
Cecilia’s deadliness. Indeed, she is rather helpless and hardly able to 
speak and thus to use her voice: “she was tearful and trying to speak” (A 
133). Atonement and self-justification, once binary distinguished pro-
cesses, the former accepting guilt, the latter denying it, are not to be 
clearly separated; this ambivalence is convenient to author-Briony who is 
constantly hovering between atonement in blaming herself and self-
justification in blaming others.  
Accepting ambivalence at the beginning of the 20th century (Part One of 
Atonement is set in 1935) is strongly associated with Enlightenment ide-
ology and its basic values and ideas, which are dependent on the exist-
ence of clarity and unambiguity, in crisis (Childs, Modernism 21, Murray 
and Tew 11-15). Rationality, reality, objectivity and truth are severely 
threatened when new philosophies, psychologies and sciences promote 
perspectivism instead of objectivity and truth, and irrationality instead of 
superior reason. Albert Einstein’s Special and General Theories of Rela-
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tivity and Henri Bergson’s la durée, for example, show reality to be an 
illusion, for time and space, considered physical certainties structuring 
reality, are proven to be dependent on the perspective and perception of 
the individual subject; consequently, objectivity and truth, basis to ra-
tionality, are recognised to be constructions and right and wrong become 
undefinable. The superiority of reason is equally scrutinised. William 
James, thus Peter Childs explains the psychologist’s concept, considers 
thought to be “fluid, fast-flowing, associative rather than structured” 
(Modernism 170); sensory impressions, in Enlightenement thought or-
dered by and thus subordinate to reason, initiate thought in the first 
place (James 542) and hence become the basis to the stream of thought 
(233).  
When young Briony watches Cecilia and Robbie by the fountain, she 
breaks with the concepts of reality, objectivity and truth promoted in 
Enlightenment ideology; instead, she accepts perspectivism and thus 
ambivalence. “She could write the scene three times over, from three 
points of view; her excitement was in the prospect of freedom, of being 
delivered from the cumbrous struggle between good and bad, heroes 
and villains” (A 40). Accepting the ambivalence of perspectives is dimin-
ishing guilt, for right and wrong become less distinguishable. “None of 
these three was bad, nor were they particularly good. She need not 
judge. There did not have to be a moral” (A 40); unambiguous judge-
ment is rendered difficult, even impossible with the acceptance of am-
bivalence and dialogue. Teenage-Briony is even in favour of stream-of-
consiousness not only focussing on perspective but on thoughts initiated 
and guided by sensory impressions instead of reason. “The age of clear 
answers was over. [...] It was thought, perception, sensations that inter-
ested her, the conscious mind as a river through time, and how to pre-
sent its onward roll, as well as all the tributaries that would swell it, and 
the obstacles that would divert it” (A 281-82). Ambivalence becomes 
highly inconvenient, however, when the process of atonement and justi-
fication is complimented by author-Briony’s longing for forgiveness, 
because forgiveness requires moral evaluation. Clarity is thus consider-
erd essential, if not necessarily to atone, to be granted forgiveness; hence 
ambivalence, in the key events of the story, is denied. Two of these key 
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events are Cecilia and Robbie’s sexual intercourse and teenage-Briony’s 
visit in Balham. 
Monologue or Dialogue?                                                                       
Inconvenient Ambivalence in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
Author-Briony finally abandons her attempt at figural narrative situation 
(A 320) and doubles back to her “starting place” (A 370), young Briony’s 
strong belief in the author’s gift and power to impose order and guide 
her readers’ judgements; in narrative, her “passion for tidiness” is satis-
fied, “for an unruly world could be made just so” (A 7) – just so leaving 
no room for opposition. Young Briony is thus depicted in favour of 
Works.  
Only when a story was finished, all fates resolved and the whole matter sealed off at both 
ends so it resembled, at least in this one respect, every other finished story in the 
world, could she feel immune, and ready to punch holes in the margins, bind the 
chapters with pieces of string, paint or draw the cover, and take the finished work to 
show to her mother, or her father, when he was home. (A 6; emphasis added)  
According to post-structuralist textual theory, a Work is a product that is 
passively consumed, that is read (Barthes, Work/Text 161). It “has nothing 
disturbing for any monistic philosophy” (160) because it offers finite and 
unambiguous meaning; thus binary classification is promoted. Young 
Briony’s “love of order also shaped the principles of justice, with death 
and marriage the main engines of housekeeping, the former being set 
aside exclusively for the morally dubious, the latter a reward withheld 
until the final page” (A 7). A Work promotes ideology in poetic justice; 
good and bad is clearly distinguished, the former is rewarded, the latter is 
punished. Accordingly, a Work promotes monological subjectivity; while 
reading a Work, a reader is guided into accepting ideological thought. A 
Text, on the contrary, has “subversive force in respect of the old classifi-
cations” (Barthes, Work/Text 157); instead of merely reading and accept-
ing old classifications, the reader is encouraged to enter into dialogue 
with various thoughts and values. A Text is a productivity that is actively 
shaped, that is (re-)written by the reader. Author-Briony, favouring per-
spectivism and discussing Cecilia’s ambivalent identities, subverts old 
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classifications; yet, she resiles from this act of subversion when describ-
ing Cecilia and Robbie’s sexual intercourse in the library. 
Cecilia and Robbie, when meeting in the library, are highly self-
consious; they are aware of their former identity (childhood friend) and 
not yet able to accept the ambivalence necessary to dialogically add the 
new identity (lover) to the former. Before overcoming their subjectivity in 
instinctive behaviour, before becoming “too selfless [...] to be embar-
rassed” (A 136; emphasis added) and thus paving the way for a subjectiv-
ity re-constituted, Robbie, trying to relax the awkward situation, is about 
to conjure for Cecilia “a private moment of exuberance, a passing impa-
tience with convention, a memory of reading the Orioli edition of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover” (A 132). Indeed, the romantic attachments described 
in D. H. Lawrence’s and author-Briony’s novels are against convention; 
not only Emily but also Cecilia and Robbie himself mind class differ-
ences.4 However, Robbie’s explicit allusion to D. H. Lawrence’s novel is 
primarily used by author-Briony to control the development of Cecilia’s 
and Robbie’s individual subjectivities. Constance Chatterley, like Cecilia, 
is “aware of a growing restlessness” (LCL5 20), “a mad restlessness” 
(LCL 20) originiating in her involuntarily narrowed personality. Getting 
married to Clifford Chatterley, Constance is not only reduced to sexual 
but also to mental nothingness (LCL 50); despite being well-educated, 
she is excluded from her husband’s conversations with friends and is 
not even required to raise children and to keep house. “Everything went 
on in pretty good order, strict cleanliness, and strict punctuality” (LCL 
17). Her life is absorbed “in Clifford and his needing her” (LCL 18); the 
rest of her life is “non-existence” (LCL 18). His wife’s dissatisfaction and 
her restlessness are not recognised by Clifford but by Oliver Mellors. 
“Clifford did not notice: those were not things he was aware of. But the 
stranger knew” (LCL 48). In their sexual intercourse and beyond, Oliver 
offers Constance (like Robbie is about to offer Cecilia) salvation in ac-
cepting her complex personality. In his letter concluding the novel, he 
writes: “There’s so much of you here with me, really – that it’s a pity you 
aren’t all here” (LCL 301; emphasis added). Significantly, most of their 
 
4 For discussions of class in Atonement, see Finney 76-77, Ingersoll 248-9, 251-52 and 
Mathews 153-4.  
5 LCL = Lawrence, D[avid] H[erbert]. Lady Chatterley’s Lover. 1928. London: Penguin, 
2006. Penguin Classics. 
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sexual intercourse happens in nature (the forest, the hut); nature, as 
environment of ambivalence, offers peace of mind to Constance.  
And she watched the daffodils go sunny in a burst of sun, that was warm on her 
hands and lap. Even she caught the faint tarry scent of the flowers. And then, being 
so still and alone, she seemed to get into the current of her proper destiny. She had 
been fastened by a rope, and jagging and snaring like a boat at its moorings. Now she 
was loose and adrift. (LCL 86; emphasis added) 
In contact with nature, Constance feels liberated from Clifford’s expecta-
tions and loose and adrift, free to come true. Cecilia, when stepping out 
of her family’s residence “into the brightness” and thus momentarily 
beyond their expectations (A 24), equally feels nature, “the rising scent 
of warmed stone” which is “like a friendly embrace” (A 25). Both women 
feel alive and at peace when in contact with nature because nature, in 
contrast to culture, is beyond expectation and decision.  
At first appearance, this interfigural approach seems to emphasise the 
importance of ambivalence; yet, binary distinction is necessary to the 
concept of Work that denies plurality and promotes the idea of the rea-
sonable author providing order, classification, definition and thus guid-
ance (Barthes, Work/Text 159); if author-Briony wants to write a Work, 
she needs to re-introduce the Enlightenment values of reason and ra-
tional subject denying ambivalence in clarity. Ambivalence is dimin-
ished in Robbie’s passion for gardening. Earl G. Ingersoll not only dis-
cusses similarities in Robbie’s and Oliver’s education but correctly calls 
them “natural” men (251), for both are working in and with nature. He 
fails to observe a crucial difference, though; while Oliver is a gamekeep-
er working in wild and hardly controllable nature, Robbie is a gardener 
working in culturised nature tamed and controlled by reason. Robbie is 
even reading a book on the gardens of Versaille (A 84), a prime example 
of culturised nature. Reason, this interfigural approach implies, is able 
to control nature and thus to restrain the disorder of ambivalence. Fur-
thermore, Cecilia and Robbie’s intercourse is “relocated” into the library, 
according to Barthes an environment of Works (Work/Text 156-57), an 
environment of authorial definition and classification. Young Briony’s 
father knows “most things worth knowing” and when he does not know 
the answer to a question, he knows “which authority to consult” and 
takes his daughter “into the library to help him find it” (A 122). A library 
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offers clarity and unambiguity. Consequently, during Cecilia and Rob-
bie’s sexual intercourse the mental obstacle of former identities is over-
come by chronological reason instead of simultaneous dialogue. The mo-
ment of “unity” is not marked by intense and overwhelming sensations. 
“Instead of an ecstatic frenzy” Cecilia and Robbie experience “stillness” 
(A 137); yet, they are not stilled “by the astonishing fact of arrival, but by 
an awed sense of return” (A 137). Subjectivity is restored when language, 
thus consciousness and finally reason return; the individuals Cecilia and 
Robbie are not re-born dialogical individual subjects accepting their am-
bivalent identities but they are re-born monological individual subjects 
clearly positioning themselves in their existence; subjectivity is not caus-
ing embarrassment because within the newly constituted subjectivity 
reason as ordering instance, hitherto denied (A 134-35), is acknowl-
edged. Familiarity, instead of causing awkwardness, is rationally accept-
ed: “Of course, there was nothing abstract about a face” (A 137). The 
adverbial of course, indicating “ordinary or due course,” “customary or-
der” and “natural result” (OED, “course, n.” def. 37.b.), conveys scientific 
logic (0-1) based on monologue instead of poetic logic (0-2) based on 
dialogue (Kristeva 70), conveys the common sense of ideology and thus 
the existence of rational and “correct” thought. They are, of course, the 
“son of Grace and Ernest Turner, the daughter of Emily and Jack Tallis, 
the childhood friends, the university acquaintances” who are “in a state 
of expansive, tranquil joy” and confront “the momentous change they 
[have] achieved” (A 137; emphasis added). Regaining the clarity they 
have temporarily lacked due to overwhelming emotions (A 134-35), the 
awkwardness they have experienced and their unreasonableness is ridi-
culed in becoming inexplicable: of course. With clarity re-established, 
Cecilia and Robbie’s former identities (son/daughther, childhood friends, 
university acquaintances) are unselfconsciously listed in chronological 
order and accepted as a past that is overcome by a momentous change. 
According to the OED, a change is a “substitution of one thing for an-
other” and a “succession of one thing in place of another” (def. 1.a.); 
instead of dialogically combining their former identities, Cecilia and 
Robbie reasonably accept their past identities and replace them; they are 
succeeded by the new identity of lover. Robbie describes this change “as 
fundamental, as fundamentally biological as birth” (A 137); according to 
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him, nothing “as singular or as important [has] happened since the day 
of his birth” (A 137). Robbie has indeed undergone a biological process 
with natural individuality becoming the basis to a newly constituted 
cultural subjectivity; however, like a child’s subjectivity his subjectivity is 
monologically constituted (Zima, Theorie 15). Cecilia is equally awed and 
returns “his gaze, struck by the sense of her own transformation, and 
overwhelmed by the beauty in a face which a lifetime’s habit had taught 
her to ignore” (A 137; emphasis added). The moment of “unity” is the 
first time Cecilia is described in peace of mind; yet, this peace of mind 
does not origin in the acceptance of ambivalence but in a “complete 
change in character” and “condition” (OED, “transformation” def. 2.). 
Change and transformation are nouns conveying completeness. Cecilia 
whispers Robbie’s “name with the deliberation of a child trying out the 
distinct sounds” (A 137); the sounds are distinct, they are clearly pro-
nounced leaving no room for ambivalence. When Robbie replies with her 
name, the syllables remain the same, the meaning, however, is different 
(A 137); the meaning has changed instead of becoming more complex. 
Subjectivity, equally, always remains the state of conscious existence but 
its content in the form of identities can be re-constituted and is in Cecil-
ia’s and Robbie’s re-birth reduced. In categorising their identities Cecilia 
and Robbie accept their past and consider it finished. The “death” in 
individuality and the “re-birth” in reduced personality depicted during 
Cecilia and Robbie’s intimacies is one of author-Briony’s tidy finishes 
she likes to make (A 353).  
Why, however, is it necessary for author-Briony to make a tidy finish, to 
promote reason and thus order and unambiguity? Why is she despite 
her interest in psychological realism and stream-of-consiousness finally 
in favour of Works? When teenage-Briony is about to visit Cecilia in 
Balham, she is wondering if she can really “hide behind some borrowed 
notions of modern writing, and drown her guilt in a stream – three 
streams! – of consciousness?” (A 320) Perspectivism is challenged and 
accused of moral neutrality; teenage-Briony finally confronts her guilt, 
and based on her statement it has been argued that author-Briony re-
frains from “neutral” figural narrative situation and self-justification in 
order to atone and provoke moral judgement. “Style, she discovers, really 
does have ethical implications” (Finney 72). Author-Briony, however, 
refrains from “ethics” and “morals” when committing a second false 
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testimony. Dialogue in the form of ambivalence and perspectivism is 
convenient to author-Briony who is torn between atonement and self-
justification; yet, dialogue is dangerous to an author whose process of 
atonement knows only forgiveness. Teenage-Briony realises that in “real” 
life she will “never undo the damage” because she is “unforgivable” (A 
285); the “only conceivable solution would be for the past never to have 
happened” (A 288). Hence author-Briony’s atonement is based on a 
second false testimony, teenage-Briony’s visit to Balham, which her 
readers need to consider reality truthfully depicted; only if she succeeds 
in convincing her readers of Cecilia and Robbie’s forgiveness towards 
her teenage-self, forgiveness is bestowed on author-Briony. Consequent-
ly, in order to guide her readers, she needs to re-introduce the Enlight-
enment values of ordering reason, unobscured unambiguity and definte 
reality which her younger self critically scrutinises in perspectivism. 
Reality, however, does not only exist; indeed, it can be constructed in 
Works structured by the superior reason of the author. 
After her birthday celebration author-Briony is wondering: “how can a 
novelist achive atonement when, with her absolute power of deciding 
outcomes, she is also God?” (A 371) Atonement, with Cecilia and Robbie 
dead in the “real” world and the existence of a higher entity denied, is 
merely an attempt (A 371), for neither forgiveness can be granted nor 
condemnation spoken. “There is no one, no entity or higher form that 
she can appeal to, or be reconciled with, or that can forgive her” (A 371). 
Atonement, however, is possible in author-Briony’s “fictional” world. 
Claudia Schemberg argues that author-Briony denies her teenage-self 
forgiveness “even in her fictional account of their happy ending” be-
cause she “has learned how to imaginatively put herself into the position 
of other people” (85); yet, to the contrary, reconciliation is foreshadowed 
in Robbie’s final reply. When teenage-Briony eventually atones for her 
false testimony, admitting the terrible distress she has caused Cecilia 
and Robbie (A 348), Robbie replys “softly” (A 348): “Just do all the things 
we’ve asked” (A 348). Robbie’s soft reply, implying kindness and gentle-
ness, strongly evokes future forgiveness, and teenage-Briony concluding-
ly observes that it is “almost conciliatory, that ‘just’, but not quite, not 
yet” (A 348). Instead of condemning teenage-Briony, Robbie’s reply 
nourishes hope: not quite, not yet, but almost, but soon. In granting her 
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teenage-self future forgiveness, author-Briony is granting forgiveness to 
herself. Young Briony strongly identifies with Arabella, her fictional 
heroine. “Of course she was taking the part of Arabella. [...]. She was not 
playing Arabella because she wrote the play, she was taking the part [...] 
because she was Arabella” (A 13); equally, author-Briony strongly identi-
fies with teenage-Briony, her fictional heroine. “I gave them happiness, 
but I was not so self-serving as to let them forgive me. Not quite, not yet” 
(A 372; emphasis added). Using the personal pronoun me, author-Briony 
equals herself with teenage-Briony; indeed, she can equal them, for, 
according to author-Briony, fiction constructs reality. “As long as there is 
a single copy, a solitary typescript of my final draft, then my spontane-
ous, fortuitous sister and her medical prince survive to love” (A 371); 
again, the world is made just so with no room for opposition. Dialogue in 
the process of atonement is thus closed; author-Briony even thinks of 
quelling the last doubt still inherent in teenage-Briony’s and thus her 
thought. “If I had the power to conjure them at my birthday celebra-
tion... Robbie and Cecilia, still alive, still in love, sitting side by side in 
the library” (A 372). Indeed, she has the power, because in “her imagina-
tion, she has set the limits and the terms” (A 371), and thus she con-
cludes: “It’s not impossible” (A 372). Author-Briony, like her younger 
self, has “always liked to make a tidy finish” (A 353). Consequently, 
Schemberg’s conclusion that, finally, “Briony abandons her role as an 
autonomous Author-God who is wholly separate, aloof, and in full con-
trol of her creation” needs to be revised (85). Author-Briony herself ad-
mits that “I have not travelled so very far after all, since I wrote my little 
play. Or rather, I’ve made a huge digression and doubled back to my 
starting place” (A 370); thus Ingersoll correctly observes that author-
Briony “in the epilogue verbalises the daunting power of the Author to 
play God with her creations” (254). And she does not only play God with 
her creations; she plays God with her readers, too. Both young and old 
Briony believe in the Work, which is, Barthes explains, “caught up in a 
process of filiation” (Work/Text 160); the author is considered “in the 
same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child” (Author 
145). Young Briony’s triumph when having finished a story is signifi-
cant; like a baby in the arms’ of its mother, the “pages of a recently fin-
ished story seemed to vibrate in her hand with all the life they con-
tained” (A 7). Accordingly, the “explanation of a work is always sought in 
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the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end [...] 
the voice of a single person, the author ‘confiding’ in us” (Barthes, Au-
thor 143). Author-Briony has given birth to a new reality and the readers’ 
tendency to seek the explanation of a Work in its author offers author-
Briony atonement and forgiveness; especially in an autobiographic novel 
with names and places unchanged (A 369), author-Briony’s readers are 
bound to identify teenage-Briony and the “confiding” author Briony 
Tallis; thus forgiveness implied in a fictional world becomes a reality. 
Nevertheless, a Work, despite the readers’ tendencies to seek explanation 
in the author, needs to be convincing in order to prevent suspicion on 
the readers’ side; indeed, if author-Briony wants her readers to believe in 
teenage-Briony’s visit to Balham and its positive outcome, she needs to 
write a readerly text that is “controlled by the principle of non-
contradiction” (Barthes, S/Z 156), a text that is controlled by the author’s 
ordering and guiding hand, a text that reduces the ambivalence implied 
in the comparisons of Cecilia to a nymph and a mermaid. 
Young Briony and author-Briony’s (necessary) belief in Work and author 
requires hierarchy accepted; hierarchy exists between author and reader, 
the former traditionally considered superior, the latter inferior, the for-
mer considered giving and guiding, the latter taking and accepting. With 
hierarchy undermined in dialogue (an idea most prominent in Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s discussion of the authoritative and internally-persuasive word, 
Julia Kristeva’s discussion of Bakhtin and Barthes’s discussion of Kriste-
va), dialogue needs to be devalued. In recanting her comparison of Cecil-
ia to a nymph, author-Briony implies the significance of hierarchy and 
thus monologue for the individual subject in society. When teenage-
Briony decides on visiting Cecilia and Robbie in Balham, Cecilia is a 
nurse working in an “Emergency Medical Services hospital, a comman-
deered place, most likely dealing with the brunt, the real brunt of the 
evacuation” (A 332). She is highly assertive and has “surely been pro-
moted to ward sister” (A 334). Cecilia thus obeys and issues orders; she 
is one chain in a monological chain of command; whithin this structure, 
she is highly capable of acting (A 334). Cecilia’s mental restlessness and 
the nymph’s frailty, once associated with Cecilia, are replaced by the 
mental assertiveness and decisiveness and the physical strength of a 
nurse; in addition, the nymph’s whiteness, indicating delicacy, has also 
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vanished. Cecilia, a hard-working nurse, is “much darker in complexion, 
and her hands too” are brown (A 331). Due to young Briony’s false tes-
timony, Cecilia has been forced into the open, into the financial (not 
mental) indepence of a hard-working nurse; her domestic identities 
(mother, sister-mother and daughter) she has abandoned. She will “never 
speak to her parents, brother or sister again” (A 205). Although her fami-
ly repeatedly tries to communicate (A 208-09), she refuses all dialogue 
and does “not wish to be contacted” (A 208). Robbie knows about the 
loss of personality this abandonment implies. He is convinced that he 
can never return (A 209); nevertheless, it troubles “him to think that she 
[is] destroying a part of herself for his sake” (A 209; emphasis added). De-
spite Robbie’s concern, however, Cecilia’s loss in personality is primarily 
depicted in positive terms because she is finally made capable of action 
without restlessness of mind. In Cecilia’s decision against her family her 
existential crisis is eventually overcome; it is not overcome, however, by 
her finally accepting her ambivalent identities in dialogical subjectivity; 
indeed, with her family uncritically judging Robbie and thus destroying 
Cecilia’s and Robbie’s lives, Cecilia, equally uncritically, blandly refuses 
her domestic identities and monologically “directs” her actions against 
her family’s ideologies and values. 
Now that I’ve broken away, I’m beginning to understand the snobbery that lay be-
hind their stupidity. My mother never forgave you your first. My father preferred to 
lose himself in his work. Leon turned out to be a grinning, spineless idiot who went 
along with everyone else. [...] I know I sound bitter, but my darling, I don’t want to 
be. I’m honestly happy with my new life and my new friends. I feel I can breathe 
now. Most of all, I have you to live for. Realistically, there had to be a choice – you or 
them. How could it be both? I never had a moment’s doubt. (A 209; emphasis added) 
Cecilia’s existential crisis origins in her indicisiveness due to binarily 
opposed ideologies of equal value; decision is impossible without reduc-
ing personality. Robbie’s prosecution, however, accepted and promoted 
by her parents and siblings, reduces the value of her mother’s expecta-
tions (upper-class marriage and family), her father’s expectations (Civil 
Service) and Cecilia’s sense of obligation towards her family, especially 
towards Leon and Briony who initiate Robbie’s prosecution due to idle-
ness and false testimony. Observing her family’s ideologies and values 
in failure, Cecilia feels finally liberated because she can clearly distin-
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guish between her family’s wrong (in)actions and values and her own 
right conduct. Cecilia must not accept ambivalence to become capable of 
action; re-introduced binary decision ensures her happiness and free-
dom. Her monological decision for Robbie and against her family 
(“both” is no option), however, is not freely taken; with the “old” ideolo-
gy determining her domestic identities and values in crisis, she can 
clearly align herself to the “new” ideology promoting her female inde-
pendence and accepting the values contradictory to her mother’s expec-
tations; decision is equalled with ideological determination. Neverthe-
less, Cecilia leaves her family only to enter into a new monological struc-
ture of command. When integrated in her family, Cecilia is living in a 
hierarchically and patriarchially structured household.    
In fact, being at odds with her father about anything at all, even an insignificant do-
mestic detail, made her uncomfortable, and nothing that great literature might have 
done to modify her sensibilities, none of the lessons of practical criticism, could 
quite deliver her from obedience. Smoking on the stairway when her father was in-
stalled in his Whitehall ministry was all the revolt her education would allow, and 
still it cost her some effort. (A 47) 
While Cecilia, aware of her transformation due to her literary studies (A 
103), is confronting her mother’s partial expectations based on public 
and private sphere, her education does not yet undermine her father’s 
authority in both private and public matters; she knows, however, that 
uncritical obedience is dangerous. The hierarchical and patriarchial 
structure issued in the EMS, on the contrary, is uncritically accepted. 
Robbie, in Dunkirk, equally emphasises the importance of command. 
“Order would prevail. No one at Cambridge taught the benefit of good 
marching order. They revered the free, unruly spirits. The poets. But 
what did the poets know about survival?” (A 264) Both Cecilia and Rob-
bie are sceptical towards the value of literary texts and free thought in 
social life and align themselves to the order of monological structures of 
command not only to become capable of action but also to become capa-
ble of life. Hierarchy is not dialogically criticised, for hierarchy is neces-
sary not only to survival in society but especially to author-Briony who 
re-introduces the advantages of monologue and hierarchy in having 
Cecilia and Robbie willingly accept hierarchical structure and monologi-
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cal command. The value of reading in initiating free thought is thus 
severly criticised with regard to “surving as a body of men” (A 264). 
During teenage-Briony’s visit to Balham, Cecilia’s nymphian and mer-
maidian ambivalence is still further diminished when author-Briony 
recants Cecilia’s femme fatale characteristics and solely focuses on those 
of the tender lover. When teenage-Briony describes her sister, her de-
scription differs crucially from Robbie’s account. The “wild flare to the 
nostrils” Robbie has once observed (A 79) is now “dainty” (A 332). Cecil-
ia, in Robbie’s description being accredited with both gracefulness and 
fierceness, now only displays elegance. Elegance, however, is traditional-
ly associated with simplicity, neatness and harmony and thus peace of 
mind (OED); ambivalence, on the contrary, is associated with complexi-
ty, disorder and disharmony and thus restlessness. In diminishing Cecil-
ia’s wildness and emphasising her daintiness, author-Briony bends at-
tention from the ambivalence she has once introduced to atone and self-
justify. Crucially, Cecilia has still a “statuesque look” (A 79-80), “some-
thing mask-like and carved about the face” (A 332), but while her “still” 
mask has previously been supposed to hide impatience and thought 
recognisable in her “dark and contemplative” eyes (A 79), her face is now 
merely “very still” (A 332). Cecilia’s stillness origins in her monological 
subjectivity; no longer confronted with the equality of binary identities, 
she has stopped to restlessly contemplate; critical and active thought, 
causing both impatience and freedom, has become futile. With this lack 
of contemplation ensuring Cecilia’s elegance, however, it is prevented 
from being considered negative; indeed, Cecilia’s peace of mind pro-
vides for Robbie’s soft and conciliatory air. For the same reason, Cecilia 
is “more beautiful than Briony” remembers (A 332). Her face, once vul-
nerable (A 332), is now “with an accentuated bow of the full purplish 
lips” (A 332); her rosebud-mouth is in full bloom; yet, this sensual aspect 
of Cecilia, especially recalling her femme fatale identity, is converted to 
tenderness.  
When Robbie is about to physically attack teenage-Briony, both Cecilia’s 
mental ease and her physical presence calm him.  
As Cecilia gripped him tighter, he twisted his whole body away from her, and they 
seemed like wrestlers as she reached up and tried to turn his head towards her. But 
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his face was tilted back, his lips retracted and teeth bared in a ghoulish parody of a 
smile. Now with two hands she was gripping his cheeks tightly, and with an effort 
she turned his face and drew it towards her own. At last he was looking into her eyes, 
but still she kept her grip on his cheeks. She pulled him closer, drawing him into her 
gaze, until their faces met and she kissed him lightly, lingeringly on the lips. With a 
tenderness that Briony remembered from years ago, waking in the night, Cecilia 
said, ‘Come back . . . Robbie, come back.’ (A 343) 
Robbie, unable to speak (A 343), is about to lose himself in instinctive 
violence and thus to become an individual. Cecilia and Robbie’s wres-
tling (gripping, twisting, turning, tilting, pulling) and Robbie’s animalis-
tic air (retracted lips, bared teeth) recall the “fierce urgency of passion 
they displayed in the library [...] in the harsh physicality with which Ce-
cilia draws Robbie back from the brink of violence against Briony” 
(Rooney 78); yet, Cecilias’s physical contact is not, contrary to their inti-
macies in the library, threatening Robbie’s subjectivity. Her touch is not 
reducing him to individuality; instead, her touch is saving his con-
sciousness. Her physical strength forces Robbie to look straight in her 
face and eyes and thus be engulfed in her stillness; furthermore, the 
light but lingering touch of her sensual lips is not inflaming him but 
calming his mind. Cecilia’s femme fatale characteristics produce the op-
posite effect; she is not threatening, she is saving Robbie from a loss of 
subjectivity, and her tender voice, instead of being Robbie’s obsession 
and death, recalls him. “He nodded faintly, and took a deep breath 
which he released slowly as she relaxed her grip and withdrew her hands 
from his face” (A 343). The following kiss, “deep” and “sustained” (A 
344), is equally free of passion, and finally, Robbie and Cecilia are shown 
“hand in hand” (A 347). Ambivalence is diminished for Cecilia is dis-
played only in the mermaidian identity of tender lover bringing salvation 
to her lover; indeed, Cecilia’s presence and voice, once inflaming Robbie 
and causing him to act maniacally, i.e. unreasonably, recalls him to rea-
son. “When he began to speak, his voice was purged of emotion. [...] His 
eyes were steady, and he had everything under control” (A 345). He then 
reasonably lists the tasks they require Briony to do and whose execution 
foreshadows forgiveness (A 345-46); thus Cecilia’s peace of mind due to 
monological subjectivity becomes the reason for Robbie’s softness and 
the foundation of future reconciliation. Moreover, foregrounding Cecil-
ia’s tenderness causes sympathy on behalf of teenage-Briony. 
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It was her sister she missed – or more precisely, it was her sister with Robbie. Their 
love. Neither Briony nor the war had destroyed it. This was what soothed her as she 
sank deeper under the city. How Cecilia had drawn him to her with her eyes. That 
tenderness in her voice when she called him back from his memories, from Dun-
kirk, or from the roads that let to it. (A 349) 
Teenage-Briony emphasises that Cecilia’s love for Robbie elevates her 
sister and that she has a high regard for the tenderness prevailing in this 
love; yet, all of Cecilia’s tender love and care is focused solely on Robbie. 
Cecilia, teenage-Briony remembers, “used to speak like that to her some-
times” and she sadly adds that unthinking family love is easily forgotten 
(A 349). Teenage-Briony is longing to be welcomed back into the loving 
family circle. Barthes accuses the readerly text of reducing the reader to 
binary distinction; “instead of functioning himself, instead of gaining 
access to the magic of the signifier, to the pleasure of writing, he is with 
no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject the text: reading 
is nothing more than a referendum” (S/Z 4). Author-Briony’s readers, 
however, are not even granted a referendum. Author-Briony demands 
forgiveness.  
Monologue or Dialogue?                                                                         
Prevailing Ambivalence in Ian McEwan’s Atonement 
Sarah Dillon, focussing on the psychoanalytic element of Kristeva’s in-
tertextuality (95-98) and referring to Barthes’s essay on the death of the 
author (98), argues that author-Briony is rather a writing subject 
(scriptor), being born in the process of writing, than an author preceed-
ing her Work (98). Author-Briony, however, deliberatly provides her 
novel with literary references, denied in post-structuralist (inter)textual 
theory (Barthes, Work/Text 160), in order to create a Work promoting 
finite meaning and thus ideology and monological subjectivity; she in-
tentionally refers to a literary text (D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover) and fictional characters with extensive mythological and literary 
tradition (nymph, mermaid) to discuss and finally de-value ambivalence 
and thus dialogical subjectivity. In “relocating” Cecilia and Robbie’s 
sexual intercourse into the library and focussing solely on Cecilia’s “pos-
itive” nymphian and mermaidian identities, author-Briony consequently 
re-introduces an ideology whose values based on rationality and unam-
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biguity assist her not only in writing a Work but also in foregrounding 
its “advantage” of stifling critical thought but allowing social survival in 
monological hierarchy. Intentional reference, author-Briony’s employ-
ment of literary texts and fictional characters indicates, can thus indeed 
promote and prevent dialogical involvement and subjectivity. Her belief to 
have finally written a readerly text denying dialogical involvement be-
comes obvious in one of her final statements. 
I know there’s always a certain kind of reader who will be compelled to ask, But what 
really happened? The answer is simple: the lovers survive and flourish. As long as 
there is a single copy, a solitary typescript of my final draft, then my spontaneous, 
fortuitous sister and her medical prince survive to love. (A 371) 
Contradiction is considered irrelevant and opposition is again rendered 
futile; indeed, why contradicting and opposing when author-Briony’s 
final draft, including a happy ending for Cecilia and Robbie in being 
united and for teenage-Briony in future reconciliation being foreshad-
owed, spares her readers the “bleakest realism” of author-Briony’s past 
(A 371)? Pretending concern for her readers, she cannot deprive them of 
the “hope” and “satisfaction” a happy ending conveys (A 371). Author-
Briony, Ángeles de la Concha argues, “rounds off her atonement with 
the precious gift that, she well knows, is available to her only in her god-
like capacity as writer: not only to free her lovers from death in her nar-
rative, but to make them immortal through literature as well” (209; cf. A 
370-72). Indeed, author-Briony undeniably admits: “I like to think that it 
isn’t weakness or evasion, but a final act of kindness, a stand against 
oblivion and despair, to let my lovers live and to unite them in the end” 
(A 371-72; emphasis added); this statement, however, is pervaded with 
doubt. Not only her diction does indirectly imply scepticism towards her 
own statement (she only assumes her final draft to be an act of kindness); 
she also directly admits her true reasons. “I’m too old, too frightened, 
too much in love with the shred of life I have remaining. I face an in-
coming tide of forgetting, and then oblivion. I no longer possess the 
courage of my pessimism” (A 371). Her authorial power is indeed a gift; 
this gift, however, becomes an instrument of power in the moment it is 
primarily employed to soothe her dying self in creating a new reality 
instead of comforting her readers with happy endings. “Through her 
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‘gift’ of artistic transformation, she deludes herself into constructing an 
‘atonement’ to allow her to face imminent death with a recovered ‘inno-
cence’” (Ingersoll 255). 
Due to the meta-fictional turn of McEwan’s novel, his readers are finally, 
some of them involuntarily (Finney 69-70), liberated from author-
Briony’s manipulation. “The final section of Atonement forces the reader 
to recognize the text as a productivity – it disallows him or her the com-
forting illusion of the monological (realist) book” (Dillon 94; cf. also 
Ingersoll 250); McEwan’s readers are forced into dialogical involvement 
when author-Briony’s reality is de-constructed and her readerly text, due 
to the meta-fictional last part, “explodes into a plurality which under-
mines its status as a readerly text, which makes it, at least in its dé-
nouement, writerly, plural, structured and yet infinite” (Allen 80). 
McEwan’s novel finally appears to be, thus David James, “a laboratory 
for authorial posturing against the illusory totality and autonomy con-
ferred by authorship itself” (95-6), and the meta-fictional turn “subverts 
the reader’s trust in the reliability of what had presented itself as a third-
person narrative, so that suddenly gaps are opened in the potential of the 
narrative to make truth-claims” (Ingersoll 253). In unveiling the illusion 
of Work and authorship, McEwan’s writerly text, promoting ambivalence 
in dialogue, becomes the basis not only to an existential crisis but equal-
ly to a dialogical subjectivity of scepticism and critical thought. This 
meta-fictional conclusion, implying the symbolic death of the author in 
author-Briony’s physical death, has been controversially discussed in 
secondary literature; the focus is usually on the birth of McEwan’s read-
ers.6 However, although speculative, it is nevertheless necessary to con-
sider author-Briony’s readers. Are they indeed guided into believing her 
fiction reality? Do they realise, without author-Briony’s “real” back-
ground finally forced upon them, her omniscience?  
A readerly text, thus Barthes, is  
controlled by the principle of non-contradiction, [...] by stressing at every opportunity 
the compatible nature of circumstances, by attaching narrated events together with a 
kind of logical “paste,” […]; it assumes the careful and suspicious mien of an individ-
ual afraid of being caught in some flagrant contradiction; it is always on the look-out 
and always, just in case, preparing its defense against the enemy that may force it to 
 
6 See Childs’s The Fiction of Ian McEwan; Childs gives an overview over various ap-
proaches to Atonement (129-43). See also Concha, Ingersoll. 
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acknowledge the scandal of some illogicality, some disturbance of “common sense.” 
(S/Z 156) 
Author-Briony admits not to be interested in facts (A 360) and counts 
herself an unreliable witness (A 358); she is accordant in diminishing 
the ambivalence dangerous to her project of atonement and forgiveness 
but she is highly unreliable in her facts and temporal structure. Teenage-
Briony has offered her novella Two Figures by a Fountain to Cyril Connol-
ly’s literary magazine Horizon and she receives his letter of refusal on 
the first day of Dunkirk evacuation, the 26th of May 1940 (A 311); never-
theless, Cecilia is telling Robbie about Connolly’s refusal in a letter he 
already receives in mid-May (A 211). Author-Briony’s story thus lacks the 
“compatible nature of circumstances” and the “logical paste” necessary 
to a readerly text that needs to forestall suspicions on part of the readers; 
she does not protect herself from attentive readers in search of illogicali-
ties and disturbances. Each Work has textual potential and each readerly 
text becomes writerly in the moment of contradiction.  
Author-Briony equally causes contradictions in constantly re-writing her 
drafts (A 369) and in her resolution for a happy ending; instead of writ-
ing a “new draft” as indicated (A 349), she merely adds her visit to Bal-
ham to her previous drafts and inconsequently adjusts those to her new 
ending. As a result, Robbie is promoted to corporal while hallucinating 
due to septicaemia and hyperpyretically waiting for his evacuation from 
Dunkirk. Robbie, a convicted criminal, is not considered “eligible for 
officer training” (A 207); during his retreat to Dunkirk, he acts like an 
officer without having “a single stripe” (A 193); nevertheless, teenage-
Briony, when visiting Cecilia and Robbie in Balham, is noticing “the 
corporal’s two stripes” on Robbie’s jacket (A 347). Robbie’s military ca-
reer is elevating him in implying his values as officer and comrade. 
While Robbie’s ineligibility for officer training is a remnant from au-
thor-Briony’s “pitiless” drafts (A 370), his career rounds off the happy 
ending she has finally resolved on. Robbie’s joyful acceptance of Cecil-
ia’s ambivalent identities after their sexual intercourse is equally a rem-
nant from author-Briony’s earlier drafts promoting atonement and self-
justification in Cecilia’s ambivalent identities. 
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His excitement was close to pain and sharpened by the pressure of contradictions: 
she was familiar like a sister, she was exotic like a lover; he had always known her, he 
knew nothing about her; she was plain, she was beautiful; she was capable – how 
easily she protected herself against her brother – and twenty minutes ago she had 
wept; his stupid letter repelled her but it unlocked her. He regretted it, and he exult-
ed in his mistake.They would be alone together soon, with more contradictions – hi-
larity and sensuousness, desire and fear at their recklessness, awe and impatience to 
begin. (A 130) 
The equality of binary distinction (sister and lover, familiarity and 
strangeness, plainness and beauty, strength and frailty) and the value of 
ambivalence in the individual subject’s resistance against ideological 
determination, implied in comparing Cecilia to a “wet” nymph and a 
“slippery” mermaid, have, at this point, already been denied in Cecilia 
and Robbie’s monological re-birth which reasonably overcomes former 
identities and contradiction and thus induces peace of mind instead of 
excitement.  
Contradictions in fact and temporal structure convert author-Briony’s 
novel, if attentively read, into a writerly text bringing dialogical involve-
ment; however, author-Briony, knowing of her unreliability concerning 
facts (A 358, 360), is aware of the danger attentive reading poses to her 
project of atonement and forgiveness. Consequently, author-Briony, in 
line with accordantly dismissing ambivalent personality, promotes read-
ing as a process of consumption (monological subjectivity) in indicating 
the post-structuralist threat reading as a process of (re-)writing (dialogi-
cal subjectivity) poses to the readers’ individual subjectivities. Young 
Briony disapprovingly thinks of Cecilia’s room that is “a stew of un-
closed books” (A 4); books unclosed, liberated from their symbolic con-
finement to library shelves and freed from their symbolic finity in book-
binding, however, indicate each Work’s textual potential (therefrom 
young Briony’s desire to bind her narratives and draw their covers: A 6).  
She had lolled about for three years at Girton with the kind of books she could equal-
ly have read at home – Jane Austen, Dickens, Conrad, all in the library downstairs, in 
complete sets. How had that pursuit, reading the novels that others took as their lei-
sure, let her think she was superior to anyone else? (A 152)  
The difference Emily is unable to recognise is Barthes’s difference be-
tween the Work that is consumed and the Text that is “experienced only in 
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an activity of production” (Work/Text 157); the Text’s “constitutive move-
ment is that of cutting across (in particular, it can cut across the work, 
several works)” (157). Cecilia, having studied in Cambridge when I. A. 
Richard’s practical criticism has first detached literary criticism from 
author-centred approaches, is skilled in “undetermined” close-reading 
and “independent” thought (A 47). In reading not only one but several 
literary texts, Cecilia produces dialogue between them in the process of 
re-writing (newly combining) and thus constitutes a Text that cuts ac-
cross Works denying all authors’ intentions and superiority. Author-
Briony, however, who requires consumption on part of her readers, 
associates Cecilia’s “unclosed books” (A 4) with her restlessness. She is 
tired of “defending, defining, attacking” that is necessary to the dialogi-
cal process of practical criticism (A 26). Closed books, on the contrary, 
are associated with Cecilia’s peace of mind. The books teenage-Briony 
observes on the table in Cecilia’s Balham-room are closed (A 335) and 
Robbie, planing next steps while sitting around the table with Cecilia 
and teenage-Briony, even lifts them to the floor (A 345); while literary 
texts have once been crucial to his future prospects as literate physician 
and thus physician exceeding all excellence (A 92-93), they are now con-
sidered a hindrance in discussing his future that has become dependent 
on ideologically and hierarchically structured military and law. Unclosed 
and closed books are the difference between active and critical productiv-
ity and passive and uncritical consumption, between dialogue and mon-
ologue; the former, author-Briony implies, is impeding the individual 
subject’s existence in society. 
The threat a Work’s textual potential poses to each individual subject is 
equally conveyed in Cecilia and Robbie’s intimate encounter in the li-
brary. Although the library is considered an environment of Works and 
thus reason and unambiguity, the textual potential continues to lie with 
the reader. Consequently, in order to prevent the reader from using this 
potential, the reader needs to be convinced of the loss of subjectivity that 
extensive re-writing results in. “One elbow was resting on the shelves, 
and she seemed to slide along them, as though about to disappear be-
tween the books. [...] It was only then that it occurred to him that she 
might not be shrinking from him, but drawing him with her deeper into 
the gloom” (A 133; emphasis added). Cecilia, sliding along the shelves, 
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establishes a physical link between the books, which denotes the mental 
but dialogical Text established between the physical but monological 
Works on the library shelves; nevertheless, the dialogue implied in her 
movement is equally suggesting the threat re-writing offers. Cecilia’s 
individual subjectivity is about to disappear between the books; her indi-
vidual subjectivity is about to become a textual and thus intangible struc-
ture. Cecilia, additionally, tries to draw Robbie into the gloom between 
the books; gloom denotes a darkness and obscurity strongly associated 
with melancholy and depression (OED) with the result that the impossi-
bility of defining the Works on the library shelves and thus Cecilia’s and 
Robbie’s identities is identified with the sadness and despair of oblivion. 
Consequently, re-writing does not only pose a threat to the actual re-
writer’s individual subjectivity but also to those of fellow individual sub-
jects; if an individual subject is unable to position itself clearly in its 
existence, it cannot interact with its fellow individual subjects; thus ac-
tive thought emerges to be an irresponsible process. Cecilia’s disappear-
ance between the books indicates the post-structuralist theory of the 
subject being itself a textual structure and lost in the process of 
(re)writing. The “a-social” and “violent” nature of this process is implied 
when Robbie, acting instinctively, pushes Cecilia “hard into the corner, 
between the books” (A 135). The process of re-writing in dialogue is thus 
associated with natural individuality, a regression to unconscious exist-
ence and its uncontrollable, instinctive and violent action; accordingly, 
ideological monologue seems the only possibility of conscious and social 
continuation. Crucially, after their re-birth in monological subjectivity, 
Cecilia and Robbie “make love against the library shelves” (A 138; em-
phasis added). Intimacies are thus not excluded from reasonable action 
but instinctive behaviour is re-captured by reason and determined in line 
with their new identity; according to the OED, to make love defines sexual 
intercourse as an act of love between lovers (“love” Def. P3.a.b). Moreo-
ver, Cecilia and Robbie make love against the shelves and do not vanish 
between the books; Works, solid in their physicalness, not Texts, vague 
in their intellectuality, allow for their “loving” intimacies and support 
them in exploring their new identity. 
Author-Briony’s readerly text becomes writerly in its contradictions in 
fact and temporal strcuture; author-Briony’s text becomes writerly in 
demanding a referendum between extremes: subjectivity vs. individuali-
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ty, dialogue vs. monologue, ambivalence vs. binarism, re-writing vs. 
consumption. Her (fictional) characters are “exemplary.” Nymphian and 
mermaidian Cecilia, aware of the simplification of binary distinction, 
prominently disappears in the gloom between the books and is re-born a 
monological subject in reason and clarity; maniacal and unreasonable 
Robbie, exhilerating in Cecilia’s ambivalent identities, prominently dis-
appears in the gloom between the books and is re-born a monological 
subject in reason and clarity; teenage-Briony, in favour of perspectivism, 
prominently disappears in the gloom of Balham tube station (A 349) and 
is re-born an author in reason and clarity. Ideologies, however, based on 
binary distinction and thus simplification, finally fail to explain the 
complexity of human existence. Some of author-Briony’s readers will 
uncritically accept her promotion of reasonable unambiguity and autho-
rial power; some of her readers, as she herself knows but ignores, will 
not: “there’s always a certain kind of reader who will be compelled to 
ask, But what really happened?” (A 371) These certain readers opt for the 
dialogical gloom of uncertainty. Individual subjectivity 
[ist] stets eine Gratwanderung zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Selbstaufgabe […]. 
Nur wer bereit ist, sich radikal zu ändern, umzudenken oder mit einem völlig neuen 
narrativen Programm anzutreten, kann Ambivalenz, Dialog, Alterität und Reflexivi-
tät als Instrument der Identitätskonstruktion nutzen. Freilich muß eine radikale 
Änderung nicht in Selbstaufgabe ausmünden; auch nicht in Inkohärenz. Identitäts-
konstruktion kann aber nicht heißen: “Kohärenz um jeden Preis”: Das wäre Ideolo-
gie. (Zima, Theorie 369) 
Entering the mermaid’s gloomy realm is risky but appaling only to those 
afraid of ambivalence; those realising the possibilities of impregnable 
sleekness remain capable of at least partially undetermined action in 
dialogical involvement with ideologies. Gloom and dialogue, conse-
quently, instead of causing melancholy and depression, become the 
basis to responsible “surviving as a body of men” (A 264). McEwan’s 
slippery novel is failproof in promoting dialogical subjectivity; if author-
Briony’s novel does not raise consciousness about ideology despite her 
inability to completely deny ambivalence, McEwan’s meta-fictional turn 
will. 
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